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ABSTRACT
A PARTNERSHIP’S CAPACITY for COMMUNITY IMPACT UNDERSTOOD
THROUGH NEOLIBERAL TECHNOLOGIES OF RISK and RESPONSIBILIZATION:
A LOOK at WORCESTER MASSACHUSETTS’ SENATOR CHARLES E. SHANNON
JR. COMMUNITY SAFETY INITIATIVE PARTNERSHIP
Katie Byrne
Since 2006, the Charles E. Shannon Jr. Community Safety Initiative has sought to reduce
youth and gang violence in multiple Massachusetts cities through partnerships of
community organizations, research institutions and police departments. Worcester,
Massachusetts was an original recipient of Shannon funding due to its historic and
increasing problem of youth and gang violence. Using a framework of governmentality,
one of the ways crime is problematized and controlled is through the use of neoliberal
technologies of risk and responsibilization, underscoring neoliberalism’s emphasis on
personal responsibility. When risk is used to govern and assigned to individuals and groups
of people living in relegated spaces, interventions become structurally blind. The
framework of governmentality and risk and responsibilization was helpful in
understanding Shannon’s capacity for a community impact in Worcester that would
address structural barriers to equality and de-individualize interventions. Interviews and
documentary analysis were conducted to understand the capacity of Worcester’s Shannon
partnership. The findings revealed successes in increasing awareness of youth violence
and inter-agency communication. However, because the Shannon Partnership in Worcester
continues to be responsive to neoliberal technologies of risk and responsibilization,
espousing a narrow interpretation of the Comprehensive Gang Model (CGM), and lacking

community participation and voice, the partnership has not, and will not, move beyond
individual programmatic responses to more structural responses to youth and gang
violence, further maintaining the status quo. In Worcester, Massachusetts, a post-industrial
gateway city, the disadvantaged ecological context of many youth’s lives disallows
progress to be made solely through programmatic services provided by the partnership’s
strategy.
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Introduction
The neoliberal state, where free-market ideology and emphasis on personal
responsibility are prolific, has created and maintained marginalized spaces where
individuals and groups are held responsible for desolate conditions (Keene & Padilla,
2014; Padilla, 2013; Slater, 2015; Wacquant, 2010), and where individuals are being
responsibilitized by programs prioritizing brutal independence, decontextualizing the
environment in which they live (Goshe, 2014; Goldson, 2005). Free-market ideology has
prioritized enterprising individuals over the social reproduction of labor, further
marginalizing communities, because opportunities are not available with the same
frequency across all spaces and neighborhoods (Young, 2014; Vidal, 1995). Urban
desolation has left many youth without opportunities for social or economic participation,
creating geographic gaps in opportunities (Wacquant, 2010; Vidal, 1995). Young people
who grow up in poor families and poor neighborhoods where disadvantage is correlated
with economic hardship, life distress and social isolation, are more likely to be delinquent
(Thornberry, Lizzote & Krohn, 2003, p. 35).
“Governmentality literature offers a powerful framework for analyzing how crime
is problematized and controlled” (Garland, 1997). Governmentality scholarship was
introduced by Michael Foucault and continued by Nikolas Rose and Peter Miller who
describe governmentality as conducting conduct, with conduct being governed when it has
appeared problematic and amenable to intervention (Miller & Rose, 2008, p. 14). Crime is
problematized and controlled partly through the use of neoliberal risk and responsibility
technologies. Remedies for problems like crime and anti-social behavior are ideas like
1

moralization and the promotion of individual responsibility, instead of wider socialstructural factors (Goldson, 2005). When risk is assigned and targeted to individuals and
groups of people living in relegated spaces, interventions become structurally blind. The
individual is problematized and contextual factors are ignored.
The matter of ‘criminality’, especially youth offending, has shifted from a purely
criminal justice matter to a matter that includes problems of education, health, employment
and the risks of social exclusion and anti-social behavior (Muncie, 2006). This has caused
governments to attack these problems through multi-agency partnerships (Muncie, 2006).
Taking Rose and Miller’s analysis of governmentality’s function of conducting conduct,
partnerships are tasked with intervening to change the behavior of individuals. Partnerships
are a form of governmentality as they encompass a “broad repertoire of technologies that
operate across the entire social field” (Dahlstedt, 2009). The move to limited government
in the U.S., and other western cultures, has supported this situation. Blurred lines between
public and private spheres has the state reliant on actors from multiple sectors to engage in
collaborations to solve contemporary challenges that the state is unable to address
(Dahlstedt, 2009). Power is now decentralized and organized in a way that provides these
“governing entities” of partnerships with the power to “conduct conduct” (Dahlstedt,
2009).
Community partnership models have become preferred and essential in western
culture for the purpose of undertaking aspects of youth justice, delinquency and violence
like prevention, intervention and suppression (Goddard, 2014). In 2006, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts, through the Executive Office of Public Safety and
2

Security (EOPSS) provided funding to several communities across the state through an $11
million dollar grant program called the Senator Charles E. Shannon Jr. Community Safety
Initiative, or ‘Shannon’ which was “created to support regional and multi-disciplinary
approaches to combat gang violence through coordinated programs for prevention and
intervention” (Van Ness, Fallon & Lawrence, 2006). Worcester, Massachusetts was one of
the original recipients of Shannon funding, due to its historical and increasing problem of
youth and gang violence. There are now fifteen communities or “regions” that receive
Shannon funding.
A Shannon eligible youth is defined by EOPSS as a youth between 10-24, living in
a high-risk area within the community, and at-risk or high-risk of becoming involved, or
currently involved, in gang activity (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2016). Shannon
uses the Comprehensive Gang Model (CGM) from the Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) that combines intervention, prevention, suppression,
community mobilization and organizational change components into a violence reduction
and gang prevention/intervention strategy. The CGM is considered an evidence based
practice (National Gang Center, 2010).
The issue that inspired examining the Shannon Partnership in Worcester was that
the partnership is in its ninth year and the structure of programmatic responses to a
community problem of youth and gang violence is still the central tenant of the
partnership, and any community impact from this sustained effort is not clear. I define
community impact as the intentional acknowledgement and removal of structural
inequalities, like gaps in education and wealth between classes and races, and the de3

individualization of interventions. Community impact is defined in this way to prevent
scapegoating individuals for community problems like violence, by examining how
individuals are at the mercy of larger societal contributions to community problems.
Through interviews with Shannon stakeholders and documentary analysis from
nine years of Shannon documents I developed an understanding of the capacity of the
partnership to make a community impact. Shannon documents emphasized the
partnership’s focus on individual reporting metrics and risk factors, and interviews with
stakeholders communicated the attention given to the risk levels of individuals, and the
limited participation of the wider community. These factors limit moving interventions
beyond the individual and widening the narrow interpretation of the CGM. The challenges
Shannon faces in making a community impact are underscored by neoliberal technologies
of risk and responsibilization that create structurally blind interventions because the
individual is assigned blame and scapegoated as the essence of the problem.
This paper does not seek to provide recommendations, because I believe that
neoliberalism and its effects are as much of a philosophical exploration of the sociopolitical, as are a state of our humanity. Any recommendations would be too dramatic to be
considered realistic. However, this paper does explore what is possible in the neoliberal
state for the community to start moving toward thinking about structural and systemic
change. This can provide a platform for which recommendations are developed. This
paper does develop means of describing the structure and mechanisms of control of a
system, in order to understand how a strategy aimed at reducing a problem rooted in that
system is achieved. “Unless, however, one can develop some means of adequately
4

describing the structure of a system, one can hardly turn to what is perhaps a more
fascinating problem of describing structural change within that system” (Laumann and
Pappi, 1976, p. 5).

An Ideological Shift and its Impact on Governing
Universal Welfare to Neoliberalism
During the 1930’s and 1940’s, during the FDR era of United States politics, the
concept of welfare offered universal economic security and “protection from the worst
consequences of life’s ordinary hazards”, and was based on a certain idea of citizenship
(Katz M., 2001, p. 4; Rose, 1999 p. 253). The state tried to grant universal economic
security by ensuring high levels of employment, social security, health, and economic
progress through the use of the tax system, investments, state planning and intervention in
the economy, and an extended bureaucratic system for social administration (Miller et al.,
2008, p. 71-72). However, by the 1960s, the notion of welfare changed; the ‘War on
Poverty’ which started in the mid- 1960s “created an underclass, stripped of self-reliance
and self-respect, equipped with a client based mentality, degraded and dependent” (Rose,
1999 p. 256; Katz M., 2001, p. 4). This was partially a result of the “selectivity of
welfarism” that was prioritized over “collectivism of welfare”, meaning benefits were
targeted upon the least well-off (Rose, 1999, p. 256). The ‘War on Poverty’ was widely
supported because of the idea that it would restore the economic and social character of
central cities (Vidal, 1995).
Neoliberalism broke with welfare by reviving liberal skepticisms of government
overreach, efficiency and bureaucracy (Miller et al., 2008, p. 79). The shift from collective
welfare acceptance to neoliberalism reframed the narrative around welfare; the United
5

States’ narrative was to get people off, to give people a ‘hand up’ not a ‘hand out’, and to
link welfare to work or preparation for work, with the mission of creating an ‘active
citizen’, as welfare dependency implied a person with a lost a sense of responsibility as a
citizen (Clarke, 2005; Young, 2002; Garland, 1997). In 1996, President Bill Clinton
signed a welfare reform bill known as the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Act to “end welfare as we know it” which effectively signaled a war on dependence,
echoing the critics of welfare who pronounced it as promoting a dependency culture and a
disincentivized will to work (Katz, M., 2001 pg. 5; Young, 2002).
Social organization is regulated through neoliberal principles of the market, no
longer including state based social provisions (Garland, 1997). The ethos of neoliberalism
emphasizes choice, personal responsibility, control over one’s own fate, self-promotion
and self-government (Rose, 1999 p. 249), designed to maximize entrepreneurial activity
(Garland, 1997). Economic entrepreneurship replaced regulation, and in doing so
encouraged individuals to optimize the quality of life for themselves and for their families
(Miller et al., 2008, p. 79). However, this segregates and vilifies those who are welfare
recipients, void of opportunities for neoliberal optimization. The marginalized underclass,
this model of welfare creates, cannot represent or organize themselves, they have to be
represented, while they are simultaneously unified spatially in ‘marginalized’ areas (Rose,
1999, p. 259). Neoliberal discourse moved the blame for the degradation of spaces where
segregated groups of people live onto those individuals and groups (Padilla, 2013;
Wacquant, 2010).

6

The shift from welfarism to neoliberalism is best understood from the
reorganization of political rationalities that is in line with contemporary technologies of
government (Miller et al., 2008, p. 80). Active agents or citizens are not necessarily an
invention of recent political regimes, but instead active citizenship, in an active society,
can be understood as the most fundamental and generalizable set of characteristics in the
neoliberal rationality of government (Miller et al., 2008, p. 41).

Free Market Ideology
Welfare was once described as “the subordination of market price to social justice”
by sociologist T.H. Marshall (Katz, M., 2001, p. 4). However, social policy is now
subordinate to economic policy, and the market price has superseded social justice (Gray,
2009; Jessop, 2002 p. 9; Katz, M., 2001, p. 5). The shift from the ‘Fordism’ era signified
by mass consumption, production and full employment to ‘Post-Fordism’ represented by
neoliberal values of free-market capitalism, a flexible workforce and production for
purposes of being competitive in the global market has created economic disadvantage and
has contributed to vast inequalities of wealth, the development of a socially excluded
underclass with high rates of structural inequality and social exclusion (Young, 2002).
These inequalities are concentrated in marginalized communities that are the outcomes of
historical and structural processes, like the globalization of the labor market (Keene &
Padilla, 2014).
“The settings in which children grow up in speak volumes about their value as
present and future members of particular societies”, observed by the neglected social
reproduction in underfunded and disadvantaged geographical areas (Katz, C., 2001). The
7

reproduction of work, knowledge, and the skills and maintenance of the forces and means
of production are the political-economic aspects of social reproduction that maintain and
reinforce class and other categories of difference (Katz, C., 2001). Over the last several
decades enterprising individuals have been prioritized over welfare programs in order to
secure the social reproduction of labor (Rodriguez, Jones & Wagman, 2015; Gray, 2009;
Miller et al., 2008; Katz. C., 2001). This has been encouraged through the move away from
a full labor force as a main objective in economic policy making, the bolstering of internal
trade policies that do not support wage growth, and a prominent neoliberal framework that
cleaved off collective welfare as a priority, replacing it with free-market economics and
capitalism (Rodriguez, et al., 2015; Gray, 2009; Miller et al., 2008; Katz. C., 2001).

Using Risk to Govern
Circuits of Inclusion and Exclusion
With markets having replaced planning as regulators of the economy, the role of
the state to provide for the populace is superseded by the expectation that individuals are to
exercise personal responsibility in order to govern their own conduct and manage risk, like
unemployment, ill health, old age (even as a victim) in order to optimize their lives (Miller
et al., 2008, p. 214-215, 79; Muncie, 2006; O’Malley, 2008; Garland, 1997). If one is not
seen as being a rational actor, responsible for his or her own risk, or observed as normal,
hardworking and decent, that individual can easily become part of the underclass as the
‘demonized other’ (Garland, 1996; Young; 2001), which increases the energy around the
‘war on dependency’ spreading the concept of ‘othering’ and placing blame on families,
individuals and communities who rely on assistance from the state. Contemporary welfare
reforms have sought to micro-manage the behavior of welfare recipients in order to re8

moralize them (Rose, 1999 p. 263). The re-moralization of welfare recipients is illustrated
in the former Mayor of New York City, Rudy Giuliani’s, declaration that welfare
recipients ought to scrub graffiti and clean streets to receive benefits (Rose, 1999, p. 263264).
‘Circuits of inclusion’, theoretical and physical spaces of self-reliance, bring in
“prudent”, “enterprising” individuals who have assumed the responsibility to manage their
own risk, by taking it upon themselves to secure property, self and family (Rose, 1999 p.
247; Garland, 1997). Social inclusion also indicates being part of the ‘flows’, with the
freedom to transverse space and experience a high degree of mobility (Warr, 2015) as well
as being targeted for the social reproduction of labor (Katz, C., 2001). Peter Miller and
Nikolas Rose describe the affiliated as those who have the financial, educational, and
moral means to ‘pass’ in their role as active citizens in responsible communities (2008, p.
98). ‘Circuits of exclusion’, abstract and visible zones of the dependent, capture and
regulate ‘risky’ individuals or those who are ‘unwilling or unable’ to manage their own
risk (Rose, 2000), often in spaces that have been marginalized, seen as a threat to public
contentment and political order (Miller et al., 2008, p. 98) and are susceptible to sparse
flows, disconnected to outside the neighborhood and not targeted for the social
reproduction of labor (Warr, 2015; Katz, C., 2001). Having limited access to broader
networks forces a reliance on the immediate neighborhood, local environments, and
networks of family and friends to satisfy needs (Warr, 2015). This becomes problematic
when those spaces and networks are beset with disinvestment, poverty and violence.
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Social exclusion is multi-dimensional, including economic, political and spatial
exclusion, meaning lack of access to information, medical provisions, housing, policing
and security (Young, 2002). This limits individuals’ capacities to develop spatial diversity
and diverse socio-economic networks, reinforcing feelings of marginalization (Warr,
2015). The circuit of exclusion is where a disproportionate number of young offenders
originate (Gray, 2009; Young, 2002), labeled as “‘criminal’, ‘near criminal’, ‘possibly
criminal’, ‘subcriminal’, anti-social, disorderly, and potentially problematic” using risk to
classify the individuals targeted for intervention, that dismisses the universality of welfare
for all children (Goldson, 2005).
Risk Factor Prevention Paradigm
When thinking about governing “risky” youth, there are parallel processes of
control happening framed by neoliberal technologies of governmentality: the
individualization of risk and the responsibilization of young offenders (Gray, 2009). Many
western countries have employed the use of the risk factor prevention paradigm (RFPP) for
crime prevention, allowing the targeting of individuals in specific geographical locations
for prevention, intervention and suppression strategies (Goddard, 2014). The risk factor
prevention paradigm (RFPP) became popular in the field of criminology in the 1990s
(Farrington, 1999), supported by an influential 1970’s Cambridge study on the risk factors
for crime (Armstrong, 2004; O’Mahony, 2009; Farrington, 1999). The RFPP’s theory is
that a reduction in crime will exist through the identification of individual risk factors
paired with intervention aimed at that risk factor (Armstrong, 2004).
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One approach to looking at a youth’s criminal career, which examines criminal
activity over time, is through the positivist paradigm that is focused on predicting criminal
careers using a list of risk factors, like the RFPP (Corr, 2014; O’Mahony, 2009). The other
approach is interactionist, setting itself apart from the previous paradigm in three ways.
One it considers the social, cultural and political processes that impact individuals’ lives,
informed by France & Homel’s recommendation that there should be greater emphasis on
the social pathways, and societal access in and out of crime (2007, p. 23; Corr, 2007).
Two, it incorporates the perspectives of the research participants, namely the meaning and
understanding they attach to their lives and experiences (Corr, 2014; France & Homel,
2007, p. 23). Lastly, it considers ‘contingencies’ that encompass the situational nature of
choices made, helping to remove the foci from individual micro-level interventions to
policy interventions (Corr, 2014).
There have been many critiques of the positivist paradigm’s reductionist
methodology, which fails to include any social structural contribution to the construction
and reproduction of offending behavior (Armstrong, 2004). Negotiation, power and
legitimacy are the social processes that the RFPP has neglected to incorporate, but are
important because, “risk and risk taking can be understood as negotiated processes, yet
criminological studies of risk have largely ignored the ways in which young people
negotiate and interact with their social worlds” (Armstrong, 2004). Furthermore, youth
living in poor areas often feel powerless over prospects for a successful future
(Arcidiacono, Procentese & Di Napoli,2007).
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Another critique of the RFPP is that it serves as an obstacle to determining a true
understanding of youth crime, with most of the identified risk factors serving as vague
proxies for criminality (O’Mahony, 2009). “The concept of offending is so value laden and
indeed ambiguous and the actions of offenders are so tied to personal and social contexts,
emotional experiences and accidents of history that there can be no such limited,
generalizable set of causal mechanisms” (O’Mahony, 2009). By using popular styles of
risk assessments, young offenders needs are equated to personal deficiencies, (Kemshall,
2008) while histories of multiple disadvantages and social and structural factors, like
poverty are dismissed and become inferior targets of intervention (Muncie, 2006,
Kemshall, 2008; Goldson, 2002).
When risk level is assigned to entire families and communities, it is read as a
precursor to criminality associated with willful irresponsibility, incorrigibility and family
and/or individual failure (Muncie, 2006). It is suggested by critics of the RFPP that more
emphasis needs to be placed on the resources young people have to enable them to make
the ‘right choices’ about risk (Kemshall, 2008). However, the approach taken to assist
youth in making the right choices about risk can dematerialize and decontextualize the
situations in which young people live (Goldson, 2002, p. 392), if a responsibilitizing
methodology is used, which places emphasis on individual responsibility and ignores
available resources, opportunities, ecological and biographical contexts.

‘Structurally Blind’ Interventions
The concept of responsibilitizing youth can lead to “structurally blind” practices for
youth justice that prioritize and implement policies focused on individual risk factors,
12

personal responsibility and agency rather than on structural contexts (Goshe, 2014;
Kemshall, 2008; Goldson, 2005). This can be summed up by what Elliot Currie (1985)
calls the “fallacy of autonomy” which presumes that the larger social context is separated
from what goes on inside the family (Goddard, 2012). Problems like unemployment and
homelessness are looked at as problems within the individual (Rose, 1999, p. 254), not
society.
In youth justice there is more emphasis on creating responsible agents than on
transforming structural barriers (Gray, 2009). Sonya Goshe argues
…there is less pressure to change the collective lot of youth when the job is
considered to be primarily a familial or parental responsibility and the cultural
mindset prioritizing brutal independence works to strip government bodies of the
duty to invest in supportive policies while leaving communities, families and
parents on the hook with scarce resources to dedicate to the task (2014).
When investment in supportive policies is lacking and brutal independence is emphasized,
systemic poverty, violence and dependency are allowed to persist because opportunities are
not available in disinvested spaces where many youth live. This could lead to punitive
punishment of youth living in these areas, however, Kevin Haines states, “it is not socially
or morally acceptable to simply punish a young person without placing them and their
actions in social context” (2000).
Structural context is consequently important to consider when creating policy.
Offending behaviors are located within powerful, structural determining contexts (Scraton
& Haydon, 2002, p. 325-326), like areas of economic disinvestment. Structural barriers do
13

not necessarily limit a young person’s agency, a universal human attribute (Garland, 1997)
to make choices, but it does his or her freedom, the capacity to chose without restraint, to
make a ‘responsible’ choice as it is clouded by external structural constraints in disinvested
areas (Clarke, 2005; Mizen, 2006; Gray, 2009; Garland, 1997).
Structural Barriers to Equality in Massachusetts
“Massachusetts, one of the wealthiest states in the nation has the ability to build an
economy in which everyone can participate fully” (Rodriquez et al., 2015). However, the
overarching neoliberal, Post-Fordist framework prioritizes the enterprising individual over
a full workforce (Rodriguez et al., 2015; Gray, 2009; Miller et al., 2008; Katz. C., 2001).
The Massachusetts Budget and Policy Center released a report that highlighted structural
incongruities between class and race and spotlighted how the black community and
communities of color are faring in terms of equality in education, economic opportunity
and health (Rodriquez et al., 2015). This report provides clear evidence that essential social
necessities are not available to everyone with the same frequency.
Poverty
The Children’s Defense Fund sets the poverty rate for children at 20% (Goshe,
2014). In Massachusetts, 31% of black kids and 38% of Hispanic kids live in poverty with
close to 25% of black kids and nearly 30% of Hispanic kids living in communities with
concentrated poverty. Impoverished areas result in higher crime rates, underperforming
schools and poor housing conditions with limited access to jobs (Rodriquez, et al., 2015;
Deuchar, 2009). These areas are under-resourced, threatening long term living conditions
of poverty (Rodriquez, et al., 2015; Deuchar, 2009). Those who live in poverty are likely
to be there because of factors that limit their inclusion into the economic system, like
14

educational success (Garbarino, 2014). However, disparities exist when defining poverty,
as Rose illustrates by stating, “Poverty and many other social ills are cast not in economic
terms but as fundamentally subjective conditions” (1999), creating ideological contentions
of the cause and solution of the problem.
Education
Various studies show the economic payoff of investment in early childhood
education, but Massachusetts has cut funding to early childhood education by 20% over
the last 15 years, with only 36% of three and four year olds receiving public support from
Head Start or a Massachusetts Department of Early Education and Care (MDEEC) subsidy
(Rodriquez et al., 2015). Worcester, a gateway city with a large percentage of families of
color is beset with fewer resources and lower incomes with roughly one third of three and
four year olds receiving no support at all for early education (Rodriquez et al., 2015).
Real Estate Policies
A higher concentration of low-income kids of color exist in a small number of high
poverty districts, with a presumed connection between this and historical real-estate
policies, like redlining neighborhoods or refusal to provide mortgages to families of color,
spurred by the creation of the Federal Housing Administration in 1934, which prevented
families of color from obtaining wealth by owning property or moving to suburbs or more
affluent parts of cities (Rodriquez et al., 2015, Katz, 2001 p. 49). In the 1930’s the first
public housing regulations sought to preserve the “neighborhood composition guidelines”,
or, “the racial status quo” (Katz, 2001 p. 49). Accumulation of wealth is vastly different
among white and black households of the same income levels. On average, a black
household will hold only 15 percent of a white household’s wealth even at the same
15

income level (Rodriquez et al., 2015). This could be a result of policies in the late 1990’s
and early 2000’s by the mortgage companies to charge higher interest rates to families of
color even if they had the same income as a white household who qualified for market rate
loans (Rodriquez et al., 2015).
Since the mid 1970’s the Congressional representation of suburbs has been greater
than that of cities (Katz, 2001, p. 6). Dramatic inequalities in services stem from the
disparity between the tax bases of suburbs and cities (Katz, 2001, p. 6). Furthermore,
during the Reagan and Bush years, cities saw a halt to federal funds, facilitating the
stagnation of economic and physical development, putting further strain on the urban poor
(Katz, 2001, p. 122-123).

Roots of Violence and Gang Involvement
In the post-industrial society, crime is filling a cultural, economic and social void (Pitts,
2001, p. 145). Crime satisfies the important functions of income, power, control and status,
making it harder to control (Pitts, 2001, p. 146).
[Crime] embodies the translation of poverty, homelessness, and frustration into
rage; it records the acting out of blocked aspirations in robbery; it traces the
consequences of low wages and joblessness in drug dealing. It follows heightened
poverty and inequality as they arc back toward the affluent in the form of street
mugging, burgled homes, and smashed windshields. It maps the consequences of
urban redevelopment that have turned city centers into places of danger by leaving
them devoid of activity after dark (Katz, M., 2001 p. 54-55).
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Violence can either be seen as a ‘thing’ that stands alone with an objective meaning of
harm, pain or death, or it can be seen as a ‘moment’ along a continuum of other moments
linked together and related to other social processes (Springer, 2012). When violence is
perceived as a ‘thing’ much of the ecological context of violence is lost, and it becomes
easy to demonize the perpetrators.
Children being and knowing they are poor, coupled with the realization that they do
not have what others have, can cause shame and can be an instigator of violence toward the
self or others (Gabarino, 2014). Anger that stems from the powerlessness felt over lived
conditions of oppression and lack of opportunity can lead to violence (Arcidiacono et al.,
2007). Shared experiences of marginalization can create oppositional attitudes toward
other socioeconomic groups and social institutions (Warr, 2015). The street gang is an
outcome of marginalization, and of “multiple marginalities” (Diego Vigil, 2010, p. 158).
When kids feel a sense of social exclusion through marginalization and stigmatism, other
forms of social capital could be sought in the form of a gang (Deuchar, 2009). In the
neoliberal state, that emphasizes personal responsibility, an effort to remedy the underlying
cause of the “threat” to social and economic life is nonexistent (Kaplan-Lyman, 2014).
Corr’s research on youths’ opportunity for leisure suggests that youths’ choices are
bound by lack of access to legitimate funds at the personal level and lack of suitable
amenities at the community level (2014). However, it is important to note that poverty and
disadvantage do not in and of themselves lead to criminality, but more so what the
variables are linked to: psychological processes of discredited identities, injustice and
inequality (O’Mahony, 2009).
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Youth and Gang Violence in Worcester
A Snapshot of Worcester
Worcester is a city of over 183,000 people (Census, 2014). The median household
income from 2009-2013 was just over $45,932 compared to the state rate of $66,866
(Census, 2014). The homeownership rate is 44.4%, compared with the state rate of 62.7%
(Census, 2014). Approximately 21.4% of people live below the poverty level, compared to
11.4% statewide (Census, 2014). There are over 11,000 businesses in Worcester, of those
7% are owned by black business owners, and 6.5% are owned by Hispanic business
owners (Census, 2014). Hispanics make up over 20% of the population, and Black or
African Americans make up over 11% (Census, 2014).
The first indicator of a gang problem in Worcester’s Post-industrial era occurred
during the early 1990’s when the police witnessed a surge of unrelated violent crimes that
could not be pieced together. In 1992, the Main South area of Worcester was seeing
destructive behavior being perpetrated by two “groups” of youth. A series of high profile
shootings in the early 90’s indicated a solidification of the gang structures that were once
acknowledged as “loosely knit” and lacking organization (Wiley, 1992a). Around this
same time, the city and police witnessed signs of potential gangs, like colors, clothing and
graffiti (Wiley, 1992a). However, some residents and students in the city schools, denied
the existence of gangs, and explained the groups as “just kids who hang around together”
(Wiley, 1992a). On the contrary, the Mayor of Worcester firmly believed that if young
people called themselves a gang, they were a gang (Wiley, 1992a). It was in 1992 that the
police developed a formal definition of a gang, but concern was voiced from the public
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about using the “gang” label so readily, as they believed a group of kids called a gang
would seek to live down that reputation (Wiley, 1992b; Monahan, 1992).
In 1993, the violence and gang activity that was “brewing”, surfaced in a more
violent way. In November of 1993 a high number of shootings and two murders occurred
(Wiley, 1993). Also in 1994, the number of assaults with a dangerous weapon in the city of
Worcester was growing faster than the national average, surpassing any other city in
Massachusetts, Rhode Island or Connecticut (Whearley, 1994). The Worcester Gang Task
Force formed in 1994, beginning the strategic cataloging of gang members and deliberate
surveillance of gang activity (Wiley, 1995). In 1995, it was reported that the city had 20
gangs, with over 200 members (Wiley, 1995; Wiley, 1995). Murders continued to rise in
the subsequent years. Nine murders were reported in 1998 (the average age of the suspects
was 20) and 14 reported in 2007 (Croteau &Whearley, 2007).
In 2010, Worcester saw an uptick in the number of shooting incidents in the city;
the year was cited as one of the most violent in in the city’s history prompting the
Worcester Police Department to implement an additional patrol unit (Croteau, 2010). In
2011, the homicide rate reached an all time high (Worcester Quarterly Report, 2015). The
Worcester Police Gang Unit believed the violence to be driven by gangs and gang involved
youth, the majority being youth of color (Worcester Quarterly Report, 2015). The pattern
of increased shooting violence continued into 2013 with a 50% rise in nonfatal shootings
compared to 2012 (Croteau, 2014). Knife violence in the same year increased at a rate of
22% compared to 2012 (Croteau, 2014).
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This rise in crime was cited as an effect of the gang activity (Croteau, 2014).
Currently there are around 1,000 “certified” gang members on the Worcester Police
Department’s Gang Unit list, however the Gang Unit has identified only a select number of
high impact players (Worcester Quarterly Report, 2015). Only about three city gangs are
driving most of the violence, and gang membership has grown in those three gangs
(Worcester Quarterly Report, 2015). In 2015, prosecutors in a case typified the violence as
a “gang war” between Main South and East Side gangs (Allen, 2015). An Assistant
District Attorney in Worcester commented on the serious series of shootings that have
occurred in 2015 saying, "These are very dangerous times and very serious incidents we're
dealing with” (Allen, 2015).

Purpose of Partnerships in Youth Justice
Welfare bureaucracies have been replaced by new logics of competition, market
segmentation and service agencies with community entities linked up in circuits of
surveillance and communication designed to minimize the riskiness of the most risky
(Rose, 1999, p. 259-260). The matter of ‘criminality’, especially youth offending, has
shifted from a purely criminal justice matter to a matter that includes problems of
education, health, employment and the risks of social exclusion and anti-social behavior
(Muncie, 2006). This has caused governments to attack these problems through multiagency partnerships (Muncie, 2006). Governing through partnerships has become more
and more common in areas like crime policy, with community partnership models
becoming preferred and essential in western culture for the purpose of undertaking aspects
of youth justice, delinquency and violence like prevention, intervention and suppression
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strategies (Dahlstedt, 2009; Goddard, 2014). Western culture is distinguished because of
the decentralization of governments.
According to Michael Foucault, who termed the concept of governmentality,
governance comprises a “broad repertoire of technologies that operate across the entire
social field” (Dahlstedt, 2009). Taking Rose and Miller’s notion of conducting conduct,
partnerships are undertaking this function of governmentality and using practice guides,
transferable models, and evaluations help to constitute governmental spaces and subjects
(Larner et al., 2005), subject to risk prediction models (Goddard, 2012). Partnerships are a
mix of specialist institutions that provide meaningful services, while also delineating
youth’s space and organizing their time (Goldson, 1997, p. 22), in an effort to
responsibilitize and manage risk. In this space emerges a set of managed socializing
activity (Goldson, 1997, p. 22), a form of governmentality.
The move to limited governments in the U.S. and other western cultures has
supported this situation, as the central government is not in control of day-to-day
operations of the partnership (Goddard, 2012). Furthermore, the blurred lines between
public and private spheres has the state relying on actors from multiple sectors to engage in
collaborations to solve contemporary challenges that the state is unable to address
(Dahlstedt, 2009). The decentralization and reorganization of power has happened in such
a way that provides the “governing entities” of partnerships with power (Dahlstedt, 2009),
like that of “conducting conduct”. The pressure of thwarting crime and enacting change is
now less of an objective of government action and more of an objective placed on
organizations, institutions and individuals of society, or the ‘everyday life world’ (Garland,
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1996). This is ‘governance-at-a-distance’ that leaves the state more powerful than before
because of its influence on organizations outside of the state, and the dissolution of the
state as the primary protector and the public’s representative (Garland, 1996).
The fundamental idea of partnerships is that they are “built on overlapping interests
that converge on the aim of improving community conditions” (Baum, 2000). A
partnership is formed under the premise that by acting together more can be accomplished
than through acting alone (Baum, 2000; Caplan & Jones, 2002; Green, 2001). However,
with the power to “conduct conduct” can come fantasies about what can realistically be
accomplished; it is often the case that the problems are bigger than the capacity of the
collective capacity (Baum, 2000). “Advocates may exaggerate partnerships’ potential,
minimize their requirements, and ignore evidence that development is often disjointed and
tenuous” (Baum, 2000). They may imagine that “simply creating a partnership magically
produces resources that will solve problems without realistically analyzing the problems,
strategizing to address them and organizing necessary resources” (Baum, 2000).
When a partnership assumes it is able to solve youth violence without addressing
structural inequalities, due to lack of wider community participation, resources, capacity,
or will, individual risk factors become the target of intervention. Strategies for intervention
are developed around personal responsibility to solve youth violence, in turn minimizing
the importance of addressing issues like poverty. The problem is considered addressed and
taken care of through a very narrow approach.
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Engaging the Community Voice in Partnerships
With a partnership’s goal of improving community conditions, it is able to
incorporate more of a focus on “bottom-up” development rather than “top down”, because
of the inclusion of grassroots organizations and community voice in the development of
partnership strategy (Larner & Butler, 2005). Furthermore, the Office of the Surgeon
General (2001) stated that public health science revealed youth violence prevention
programs were most effective if they were science based, comprehensive and included
coaction by schools, communities and families (Backer & Russ, 2007). The emphasis in
this section is on the inclusion of communities, families and I go as far as to say even the
individuals affected by the interventions.
Community based participatory research (CBPR) is revered for its inclusion of the
community in decision making processes (Bidwell, 2009). Through an emancipatory
process of research and action the community is empowered to control the decisionmaking and are given legitimate voice (Bidwell, 2009). CBPR, or community engaged
research (CER), similar to CBPR could be a part of a community mobilization effort in
youth violence prevention. CER is defined as “a collaborative approach to research that
democratically involves community participants and researchers in one of more phases of
the research process” (Nation, Bess, Voight, Perkins & Juarez, 2011). The method of CER
relies on the understanding of the target of research and the integration of the learned
knowledge into the action to improve the community (Nation, et al., 2011). Participatory
research approaches aim to democratize the creation of knowledge, legitimizing the world
view of the powerless (Stoecker & Bonacich, 1992). Furthermore, the aim is for
23

knowledge to lead to empowerment (Stoecker, et al., 1992). Knowledge should not rest
only in the minds of the professionals used to study objects, but the knowledge, and
theories of oppression, should be created and used by oppressed and powerless
communities as well (Stoecker, et al., 1992).
There is concern voiced in the research as to how much research is applied to a
community but developed through a relationship between the grant agency and researchers
rather than between the researchers and the community (Green et al., 2001). Partnerships
with the greatest potential for action include overlapping understanding of the public’s
perceived needs and actual needs as well as the resources to carry out the action (Green et.
al, 2001). Partnerships have the power to increase understanding of the public’s actual
needs (Green et al., 2001), however, this most likely requires participatory research or
organizational development and community mobilization.
Critical to this approach is the following consideration: “communities are
somewhat unaware of how power and structural forces influence their lives, and this
awareness must first be addressed via empirical evidence in order to provide a foundation
for subsequent critical action” (Nation, et al., 2011). Integrating this type of community
based approach into violence prevention efforts would require acknowledgement and
agreement about the root of the problem, and the encouragement of dissent and
acknowledgement of power differentials between groups (Nation, et al., 2011).
The ideal model of CBPR can often fall short of what is possible in reality due to
factors like bureaucracy of government agencies or lack of interest, or irreconcilable power
differentials (Stoecker, et al., 1992; Nation, et al., 2011). Even with CBPR principles in
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place, a political framework that no longer guarantees public welfare exists. However,
CBPR can be, and should be used to push on the status quo of development and
community intervention, and the ideals of this model should be what partnerships striving
for community impact should evaluate themselves against (Stoecker, et al., 1992).

Using a Framework for Service: The Comprehensive Gang Model
Gang prevention programs that utilize the Comprehensive Gang Model (CGM)
embody the theory that gang violence is an outcome of social disorganization, where key
organizations are not collaborating, and where there are insufficient resources to target
youth (National Gang Center, 2010). This theory calls for organizations to work together in
a coordinated manner that is team focused, integrated and inclusive of law enforcement,
social welfare organizations and grassroots organizations (National Gang Center, 2010).
Shannon grantees are expected to utilize the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention’s (OJJDP) CGM that EOPSS endorses. This model incorporates five areas:
Suppression, Social Intervention, Opportunities Provision, Organizational Change and
Community Mobilization. The CGM can be described as a “script” (Garland, 2012) given
to the partners by the state.
The CGM is also termed the “Spergel Model” because in the late 1980’s OJJDP
conducted a juvenile gang suppression and intervention research and development program
led by the late Dr. Irving Spergel, a professor from the University of Chicago (National
Gang Center, 2010). The five strategies that eventually became the CGM were
consolidated from a national assessment of organization, agency and community groups’
responses to gang problems in the United States (National Gang Center, 2010). The
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findings from this national assessment identified the strategies these groups used for
violence reduction, which then become the CGM (National Gang Center, 2010).
The CGM is considered an evidence based practice, and violence reduction is
thought to occur with investment into each of the five areas. The Little Village Gang
Reduction Project (GVRP) in Chicago’s gang ridden Little Village utilized the CGM in
their response to the ongoing youth and gang violence (NIJ, Program Profiles). The GVRP
was evaluated using a quasi-experimental design. Three groups of youth were included in
the design, youth who were part of the program group, youth who received some services,
and youth in the comparison group who received no services. Changes in arrest histories
for a four and a half period before the program and a four and a half year period program
period were compared. The GVRP saw reductions in arrests for violent crimes and drug
crimes, but did not appear to have an effect on property crimes or total arrests (NIJ,
Program Profiles). The Model Programs Guide from OJJDP rates this program as
promising, this is the only evaluated program in the Models Program Guide that used the
CGM as a framework for violence and gang reduction (NIJ, Program Profiles).
Limits of the CGM in Addressing Structural Barriers
Although the CGM is seen as promising and is promoted as an evidence based
strategy, it promotes increased programmatic activity and communication between entities,
with an acceptance for narrow implementation by users. Given this, there are limitations
of this model in addressing structural barriers, like inequality of wealth and systemic
violence and racism that will inevitably limit its capacity to reduce and prevent youth and
gang violence.
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Social Intervention
Social intervention practices are usually based within local community-based
organizations that facilitate programs aimed at socialization and community protection,
with an emphasis on mainstreaming gang youth (Spergel, 1995, p. 185). The critique of
early intervention is that it is associated with risk; if early intervention is delivered based
on assigned risk levels then the right to belong in ‘circuits of inclusion’ if non-criminality
is sustained, will be reinforced (Kemshall, 2008). Early intervention programs are only as
effective to the extent that the larger social system supports them (Garbarino, 2014), and
resists further marginalizing people and places by removing the emphasis on
responsibilization.
Opportunities Provision
Opportunities provision is the provision of additional social opportunities through
specific educational, training and employment programs (Spergel, 1995, p. 184).
Worcester Shannon’s main focus is providing opportunities to youth, mostly in the form of
job opportunities. However, there is little to suggest that brief employment, not connected
to any other aspect of a youth’s life, will cause a reduction in delinquent behavior, taking
into consideration the age of the target population and the environment where the youth
reside (Alstrohm & Havighurst, 1982; Apel, Paternoster, Bushway & Brame, 2006;
Bushway & Reuter, 2002; Collura, 2010; Crowley, 1984; Mihalic & Elliot, 1997;
Paternoster, Bushway, Brame & Apel, 2003; Pilavin & Masters, 1981; Ploeger, 1997;
Smith & Thompson, 1983; Staff, Osgood, Schulenberg, Bachman, Messersmith, 2010;
Staff & Uggen, 2003; Sullivan, 1984; Sviridoff & McElroy, 1985; Uggen & Wakefield,
2008; Votey, 1991; Wald & Martinez, 2003; Wright, Cullen & Williams, 1997). Research
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conducted by Hazel, Hagell, Liddle, Archer, Grimshaw and King (2002), cited in Gray,
evaluated the value of detention employment training programs and found that while in
detention many youth had positive attitudes about employment and were fully
participating, however when released, less than one fifth of participants were involved in
work (2009). This could be a result of youth returning back to the same environments they
were in before they were sent to detention.
Shannon programs focus on the supply side of unemployment with emphasis on
the individual’s motivation. When assessing individual behavior and focusing on
responsibilitizing youth through jobs, failure is understood as a lack of motivation rather
than lack of opportunity from poor economic conditions. Poor economic conditions
produce low wages, and low quality jobs (Hannah-Moffat, 2005) that stand in the way of
sustained employment and livable wages. “The concept of transformation has become
depoliticized and detached from any association with radical structural reform through the
redistribution of resources and opportunity or through direct government intervention in
the economy to stimulate demand for youth labor or regulate the types of work being
created by the free market” (Hannah-Moffat, 2005; Mizen, 2006). A strategy like this will
not intervene to invigorate the structural links between poor neighborhoods and labor
markets (Pitts, 2001, p. 147). Without the government regulating employers and the labor
market, young people will continue to participate in low quality work training and low
wage, low-skilled, short term employment (Mizen, 2006, p. 197).
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Suppression
Suppression through the CGM is defined as formal and informal control procedures
like surveillance, supervision and monitoring of youth by police and community-based
agencies (Spergel, 1995, p. 185). Swaths of space are opened to surveillance, a mechanism
of control disproportionately affecting youth of color because the places youth of color are
most likely to live are spaces that are governed, socially ordered and managed through a
RFPP (Goddard, 2012). Even though crime and high risk victimization have an uneven
social distribution, they are perceived as facts of modern life (Garland, 1996), increasing
the threat felt by the public and the justification for potentially punitive punishments and
surveillance. There is essentially a punitive bind where police officers are tasked with
applying punitive sanctions on disorderly individuals but these sanctions do nothing to get
at the underlying causes of violence (Kaplan-Lyman, 2014).
Suppression efforts remain insufficient if not in collaboration with other areas of
the CGM (Spergel, 1995, p. 185). The CGM dictates work happen on both ends of the
spectrum, prevention and suppression, which begs the question: are youth seen as
endangered innocents, or dangerous and unworthy (Tilton, 2010), or both, and how does
the public, and Shannon partnership reconcile this dichotomy? The dichotomous CGM
provides no answer or guidance to understanding that question.
Community Mobilization and Organizational Change
Community mobilization was first utilized as a way to counter social
disorganization (Spergel, 1995, p. 172). In the 1980’s and 1990’s it grew into a strategy to
develop and involve coalitions of justice agencies with schools, community groups and
even former gang members with local, state, federal agencies and resources to deal
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collectively with the problem of gangs (Spergel, 1995, p. 172). Through Spergel’s
explanation of community mobilization, police are in key coordination positions to deal
with problems (1995, p. 172). Not mentioned in the community mobilization strategy is the
importance of community participation and accountability by community members.
Organizational change calls for the previous strategies to be organized and
integrated depending on the scope of the problem and the mission of the organization
(Spergel, 1995, p. 185). Critical elements of this strategy are agency collaboration, joint
planning and information sharing (National Gang Center, 2010). Organizational change, as
it is defined, does not call for putting pressure on larger systems and policies, it does
however call for the organization policies and practices to be inclusive and community
oriented (National Gang Center, 2010). The lack of clarity of what organizational change is
and should be does not easily encourage a discussion and move toward incorporating
systems change into the CGM.

Methodology
The primary research question that the current research was aimed at answering
was “can a youth and gang violence prevention partnership that employs programmatic
strategies and neoliberal technologies of risk and responsibilization have a successful
community impact?” Documentary analysis and interviews were used to gather
information to inform this research question. Themes from the interviews and documents
were then compiled and given meaning through existing literature on associated topics.
Primary qualitative research was obtained from both documentary analysis and
interviews. Shannon documents from 2006-2016 such as yearly reports, grant proposals,
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The Executive Office of Public Safety and Security’s (EOPSS) Availability of Grant
Funds, quarterly progress reports, meeting minutes, Local Action Research Partner
(LARP) publications and newspaper clippings were examined. These documents
contained information on the history of Shannon, Shannon goals, communication between
partners, outcomes of programs, challenges, the scope of Shannon programs, the current
climate of the city’s youth violence problem illustrated by news clippings, anecdotes and
data, and the outcomes of Shannon in respect to strengthening partnerships and achieving
outcomes.
Qualitative research was also obtained from interviews with eight stakeholders of
the Shannon partnership. These participants were selected because of their varying
experience in Shannon and the information they could provide about the value of Shannon
to the community. The interviewees were two senior researchers with Clark as part of the
LARP; a Sergeant in the Worcester Police Department who serves as the Shannon Program
Coordinator; a Caseworker with the Boys & Girls Club (BGC); the Outreach Coordinator
with Straight Ahead Ministries (SAM); the Job Coordinator with the Worcester
Community Action Council (WCAC); the Director of Planning at the WCAC and the
previous Grants Coordinator for the City of Worcester; and the Director of WCAC’s Jobs
and Education Center.
These participants were either recruited at a Shannon Advisory Committee
meeting, through an email, or both. All participants signed a consent form agreeing to
participate. Participants were either representatives of programs, members of the LARP or
situated at the decision making level. The interview contained questions about individual
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and organizational roles of Shannon, Shannon’s role in addressing youth and gang
violence, the function of the partnership, and organizational culture.

Findings
History of Shannon
Worcester, Massachusetts was one of the original communities to receive Shannon
funding due to its historical and increasing problem of youth and gang violence. Shannon
funding was not the first effort made to address the problem (Phase 1 Case Study, 2006).
However, the influx of new money from the Shannon program allowed for the expansion
of existing organizations, the formalization of relationships with community outreach
organizations, increased staffing of the Worcester Police Department (WPD), greater
information sharing, and the development of a referral system that helped to define
organizational roles and responsibilities and lessen potential duplication of services. (Phase
1 Case Study, 2006).
Worcester Shannon Model
Currently, Worcester Shannon has allocated funding into four areas: Suppression,
Opportunities Provision, Social Intervention and Community Mobilization. The Worcester
Police Department through tactical response teams, and the Project Night Light program
handles suppression. Even though Organizational Change is not a funded strategy the
funding of a sergeant in the police department to manage Shannon provides the
opportunity for organizational change. The Worcester Youth Center (WYC) and BGC
through case management and job placement services handle opportunities provision.
Social intervention is done through police youth recreation programs, the Final Notice
program, the WPD Summer GANG program, the Police-Clergy-Youth partnership and
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SAM street outreach. Community mobilization practiced through a Clergy Mentoring
program. Partners come together through Steering Committee meetings or Advisory
Committee Meetings that happen as frequently as quarterly to as in frequently as twice a
year or less.

Partner Roles
The functions the Shannon partner organizations have, academic, programmatic, or
managerial, provide an understanding of any hierarchy that exists within the partnership
when it comes to decision making and strategy formulation. It also illuminates the capacity
of the partnership when determining its current ability to harness grassroots and
community voice.
Clark University
Clark University’s role in Shannon is as the Local Action Research Partner or
LARP. The LARP, according to the WPD, was responsible for providing the Worcester
collaboration with the tools necessary to determine if the programs are reaching the correct
audiences and achieving the intended results. Two senior researchers have been involved
in Shannon for nine years.
Early on, a lot of the work done by the LARP was trying to understand what
Shannon required and building the proper framework to encompass the requirements. The
LARP also spent time early on explaining its role, discussing data at meetings, and
focusing on small projects. The first program implemented was an employment program.
The LARP’s role was to develop research around this program, ultimately providing
recommendations on how the program should be tailored to fit the needs of the kids,
partially done by assisting with interviews conducted with kids in the programs. Both
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senior researchers remarked that Shannon was very program focused in the beginning, and
still operates using a program model for services. The LARP’s role is action research,
action research is a cyclical process of problematization, data collection and analysis, and
reflection (Riel, 2010-2016). In this model there is not an expectation of CBPR, instead it
is more of an insular research model where knowledge is generated and shared within the
partnership. The improvement of the community is a goal of action research (Riel, 20102016), however knowledge generated and developed by research for research undermines
the necessity of community empowerment, effectually maintaining the status quo.
Worcester Police Department
A Sergeant within the WPD was selected by the city to be the Program Coordinator
for Shannon within the Police Department. The Program Coordinator stated that he
believed the purpose of Shannon was to increase the collaboration of the police with
community organizations. The emphasis on community policing in the last several decades
has created an expectation for police to work through networks and partnerships for crime
prevention (Fleming, 2006 p. 87). Since 1996, the Program Coordinator has served in the
Gang Unit, and has been a Sergeant since 2006. The WPD has control over funding
allocation to partners. The Program Coordinator explained that the money decisions are
made between himself and the Chief and another woman within the police department. He
does not think his role has evolved much since the beginning; in the beginning it was a lot
of building, and the work happened with one or two community partners. He stated that the
city has been tough about bringing new people in and he has had to vouch for a lot of
people to really build up the partnership and the coalition stating, “It is tough to bridge
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those partnerships since many organizations don’t necessarily fall within the purview of
Shannon and it is hard to make the case that they do”.
Straight Ahead Ministries
The Director of Outreach at Straight Ahead Ministries (SAM), a faith-based
organization that has been part of the partnership since 2012, describes his role as
primarily outreach and he likes to think he has some decision making power in the Steering
Committee meetings when it comes to the direction and implementation of outreach
services through Shannon. The Director of Outreach describes SAM’s perspective of the
problem from a relational perspective, advocating for the youth, trying to understand the
whole dynamic and the whole family, the needs of the family, and the specific needs of the
youth. He believes the role of outreach is to be out in community, seeing what the needs
are, thinking about socio-economic needs and trying to develop a relationship with the
youth. He believes that outreach can only impart hope and choices, outreach workers are
not out there to say this is “good or bad”, but instead to provide other options. Since he
sees the gangs and violence as more generational, he believes youth see the violence and
gang membership as what they aspire to be, and through outreach he able to give another
option, and to share his personal experiences and upbringing to show them something
different.
Boys and Girls Club
The Case Manager with the Boys and Girls Club described his understanding of
Shannon is that it is a preventative program targeted for youth at risk of joining gangs. A
lot of the work he is doing with Shannon is already a part the Boys and Girls Club’s
mission. He describes his work as forming relationships with youth and supporting youth
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to make the right decisions, noting that some youth are in a place to receive it and some
youth are not.
Worcester Community Action Council
The Worcester Community Action Council (WCAC) was the main programmatic
partner offering a summer jobs program through their job and education center. WCAC’s,
jobs coordinator, Director of Planning, and Director of Jobs and Education were
interviewed. The job coordinator described that about 10-15% of his work with WCAC is
Shannon related. The Director of Planning remarked that the partners all know their roles
and what they are supposed to be doing, so the role of WCAC has not changed, despite
changes in funding and program structure over the nine years. The Director of Jobs and
Education voiced that she is not familiar with much of what the other partners are doing,
but she is very invested in providing services through WCAC that are in line with the
mission of Shannon.

Partnership Capacity in Making a Community Impact
The rise of partnering to solve community problems, with partnerships being an
extension of governmentality, as power is decentralized at the state level and reorganized
in entities like partnerships, raises the question of whether Shannon has the capacity and
power to make a significant community impact with the strategy employed. Through the
interviews with Shannon partners several themes emerged regarding both the challenges
and successes of Shannon in making a community impact. The challenge that
neoliberalism poses to moving beyond individual responsibility is illuminated through the
findings that individuals are the identified targets of intervention. Because of this there is a
pressure on and expectation of partners to show outcomes based on individual
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measurements that decontextualize a youth’s life. Shannon is also faced with having to be
responsive to the punitive public attitudes of justice that individualize and decontextualize
behavior. Additionally, a siloed and centralized structure exists within the partnership that
hinders the partnership from moving beyond coordinating to collaborating. This structure
and narrow interpretation of the CGM also limits the capacity of Shannon to bring missing
community voices into the planning and decision making process, effectually preventing
alternative interpretations of the problem and potential solutions from being explored.
These alternatives could work to break the individualized focus of Shannon. Given these
challenges, some successes have been described as less competition, more comfort in the
partnership and the individual success stories.

Barriers & Challenges
Individuals as Targets of Intervention
Pragmatic “quick fixes” are usually prioritized over critical research and policy
proposals that have the potential for transformative change (Muncie, 2006). To really
challenge the status quo the real target must be systems change, but without systems
change being the shared “phenomena of interest” in Shannon it becomes impossible to
challenge the status quo in a significant way (Seidman, 1988). From the interviews with
stakeholders and Shannon documents it was clear that the ‘phenomena of interest’ is
individualized or is an aggregate of the individual (Seidman, 1988). Interviewees agreed
that the shared phenomenon of interest in Shannon is ‘at-risk’ or ‘high-risk’ youth,
supported by information in Shannon grant proposals. The three prongs of the CGM that
are utilized in Worcester are focused on individual targets that function to “conduct
conduct” and responsibilitize youth.
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During the first few years of Shannon the LARP created a logic model that laid out
the overarching goal of Shannon and shared with the partners. The overarching goal was
preventing vulnerable youth from becoming involved in gangs or adopting gang behavior,
reducing current gun and gang violence, improving quality of life for at-risk youth,
increasing education, job skills, and job opportunities for re-entry offenders. The
assumption was that an interdisciplinary approach of criminal justice, community service,
educational and job training services and re-entry strategies and life skills activities are
important to the overall violence prevention/reduction plan (LARP, Year Two Final
Report, 2009). However, this strategy was not outside of the confines of the CGM’s
provisions and did not include community mobilization or organizational change activities.
Youth who fit the aforementioned description of “vulnerable” and “at-risk”, as well as
some “high risk” and “proven risk” youth are still the targets of intervention. A Shannon
eligible youth is defined by EOPSS as a youth between 10-24, living in a high-risk area
within the community, and at-risk or high-risk of becoming involved, or currently
involved, in gang activity (Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 2016).
In 2015, the Shannon grant proposal required all programs to implement a risk assessment
to determine Shannon eligibility and aid in case management. When the target of
intervention is the individual, the response becomes heavily biased toward programs and
the use of risk to identify individuals.
Research on youth offenders’ leisure careers in Ireland revealed that responses to
youth offending must move from a focus on the individual to one that incorporates an
understanding of the broader socio-economic and cultural context because of the finding
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that the onset of youth offending is nestled in the context of disruption and disadvantage
(Corr, 2014). One of the senior researchers rhetorically questioned how an opportunity can
supersede an environment by asking how it is possible for a youth to see a real, genuine
opportunity given to them as a chance for success if that youth’s biographical narrative is
marked by family or neighborhood distress with generational histories of violence, and
exposure to inequality, violence and negative behaviors? SAM’s Director of Outreach
stated: “[Youth] could have a job and a GED, but are still in shit situation, or the other way
around.” It becomes impossible to separate the opportunity from the context and to see the
opportunity as equally accessible across diverse spaces and between all youth.
Much research supports the notion that “young people in trouble with the law have
complex systematic patterns of disadvantage which lie beyond any incitement to find
work, behave properly or take up the ‘new opportunities’ on offer (Muncie, 2006), or the
opportunities might simply not be there (Vidal, 1995). SAM’s Director of Outreach
expressed that, even though he is appreciative of the unique voices present at the table, the
biggest barrier he sees in making concerted progress in youth justice is the difficulty some
people have in suspending their views and natural way of thinking about what success
looks like, like thinking that a kid is not worth the investment, or that the kid won’t make
the investment themselves. Essentially, there is a modality of thinking that supports the
responsibilization notion and ignores structural barriers.
When youth fail to be ‘responsibilitized’ they are often excluded in various ways by
society (Muncie, 2006). This then creates a cyclical pattern of condemnation and abjection.
The Program Coordinator represented this notion by sharing how some police officers are
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quick to write off a youth who has failed to change his or her behavior after punishment.
Some could argue that when individuals are given a sense of autonomy to be enterprising
and responsible it equates to greater freedom, which echoes police officers’ frustrations as
to why a youth did not change when given a chance. However, “it would be wrong to
mistake this independence for freedom, since autonomy must be exercised responsibly”
(Clarke, 2005). Essentially, youth who are most likely to come into contact with the
justice system are most likely captured in some way by programs or partnership efforts,
however the opportunities on offer from those programs do not grant them broader
freedoms to be autonomous and productive given biographical and ecological milieu
addressed in earlier sections of this paper.
In a way, since police have no control or perhaps might be lacking nuanced and
sensitive knowledge over the youths’ milieu, it is understandable as to why frustration
would stem from repetitious negative behavior. Moreover, police do not have specialized
competence in addressing the underlying causes, like poverty and mental illness, of the
disorder they are policing (Kaplan-Lyman, 2014). However, these tense relations between
police and youth do little to increase trust and respect between police and youth and make
progress toward reducing youth and gang violence. By extension, it can be argued that the
partnership as a whole does not have the power to address the underlying causes of the
disorder they are trying to control, however since it is a form of governmentality it is
tasked with controlling crime and behavior, and it doing so with a focus on individual
responsibility in line with neoliberalism and the greater goals of the state.
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Pressure to Show Outcomes
SAM’s Director of Outreach and other interviewees expressed how much pressure
there is to show outcomes. Most funding cycles require resubmission of applications with
some sort of outcome measured. He said, “How am I supposed to show anything after two
years? Sometimes it takes ten.” Another problem with the pressure to measure outcomes is
that it only shows a snapshot of what is going on with that youth (Goshe, 2014),
emphasizing the individual. SAM’s Director of Outreach said you could give a kid four
hours a day of services and support, but we have no control of what goes on the other 20.
If a measurement such as recidivism is used to measure outcomes, those youth who fail to
recidivate could still be enduring a great deal of suffering in their environments, as they are
sent back to their unchanged social surroundings and potentially continuing to engage in
negative behavior whether they are caught or not (Goshe, 2014). Even though it should be
top social priority, it is out of the current capacity of the partnership to prioritize youth’s
physical, material and emotional security (Goshe, 2014). WCAC’s Director of Planning
expressed how when outcomes are measured it is done through numbers, and numbers
hardly show a true picture, stating that you cannot interpret anything from a quantitative
measurement of how many youth completed a job training program, and wishes stories
could be incorporated to show a fuller picture.
When pressure for cost-effectiveness of programs is put on agencies, administration
may get in the habit of ‘stacking the deck’ with kids who are not in need of as much
(Goshe, 2014). This was reiterated by a senior researcher who remarked in the first four to
five years, Shannon partners would come to meetings ready to talk about successes and
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little conversation about problems, challenges or failures would arise. There is also
evidence of this from Worcester’s Shannon population numbers, over half of all youth
served in Shannon programs are considered to be “at-risk”. During a technical assistance
meeting coordinated by Northeastern University, a senior researcher remembers a speaker
asking: “Is your failure rate high enough? If not, you’re not going after the highest risk
kids.” Targeting non-gang members or former gang members is a waste of a program’s
resources and could produce secondary deviance (Decker, Pyrooz, Sweeten, Moule, 2014).
It is easy to work with low-risk kids. It makes sense that the pressure to show
individual outcomes in hopes of relaying positive results to ensure the procurement of
sustained funding is the tendency of many organizations in this field. Many of the
Shannon programs are prevention based, meaning an inherent focus on prevention
programs, and younger lower risk youth. Taking the efficacy of focusing on individual
interventions instead of structural interventions out of the question, if the problem is youth
and gang violence, and most programs are prevention based, is it safe to conclude the right
population within the target is being reached to achieve a measurable community impact?
Public Attitudes of Justice
Youth are economically and legally dependent on their parents until a certain age
which makes them a good target for help, but even within that structure, there is a
hesitance to being ‘too soft or coddling’ (Goshe, 2014). Neoliberalism has contributed to
the rise of ‘law and order politics, with punishment being profoundly respected and seen as
essential to ensuring personal accountability for ‘choices’ (Tilton, 2010 p. 6, 106; Goshe,
2014). The examples below highlight public perception, or those who voice opinions on
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social media, of youth punishment. Not illustrated by the quotes below, but there was a
definite difference in responses to a program that was perceived as holding kids
responsible and a program that was perceived as letting kids off the hook, with the latter
comments hostile and the former more welcoming.
Comments on the article: “Teen Caught Stealing Money from Inside a Vehicle”1,
were:
-

“I agree, I'd never leave my wallet in my car but that's not the point. The point
is the guy's a scumbag and hopefully justice is served. Then again, this is
Worcester... The suspect, although legally an adult, will probably get treated
like a little kid and get a slap on the wrist.”

-

“I hope someone goes and robs his parents now that his address is published.
Payback. Loser.”

-

“Lazy scumbag who won't get a job , but will steal from people who do..Trash.”

-

“Bring back reform schools. Nip it in the bud.”
o “How about corporal punishment instead?”

-

“I would have smashed his head in with a metal bat to many laws protect theses
little punks .. mess with a bull you get the horns.. this group of kids gonna get it
soon..”.

A memo was posted on the WPD Facebook page titled, “The Worcester Reentry
Program”2, which explained the program as a way for high-risk offenders leaving prison to

“Teen Caught Stealing Money From Inside a Vehicle”,
https://www.facebook.com/WorcesterPolice/posts/896919083663195
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be offered wrap-around services in an effort to prevent them from reoffending.
Commenters expressed feelings about this being a waste of money. One commenter wrote,
“…they should just be kept locked up”. The “fairness” of this program was addressed by
this man’s comment, “I've never been arrested can I get employment training and
participate in educational programs or do I need to be arrested first?” to which others
followed suit.
Although this representation of comments is not a true sample of the population,
the sentiment of favoring punishment is an overwhelming share of what is seen in the
media, and what Shannon is faced with having to be responsive. The macro-systems are
defined as the “big social and institutional blueprints of society”, or social cultural forces,
even as big and abstract as they are, they are imbedded in the consciousness of children,
parents and policy makers (Garabino, 2014). The notions of ‘law and order’, ‘fairness’ and
‘justice’ are embedded into the minds of the populace, though the interpretation of these
concepts varies. SAM’s Director of Outreach describes the other end of justice and
fairness by describing the area of justice Shannon is not touching. He wishes for ‘justice’
and ‘fairness’ that supports positive action. One example of this he gives is the unequal
legal representation of all youth, stating: “I have worked with a lot of kids, because of
their background they don’t have attorneys and a simple charge, trespassing, turns into
assault and battery, it is a sad state of affairs, they are losing that battle because the charge
turns into a sentence, they end up with a plea deal, and there goes their future.”
“The Worcester Reentry Program”
https://www.facebook.com/media/set/?set=a.634918159863290.1073741841.33740223961
4885&type=1
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Shannon is not only fighting against the preference of punitive punishment, but the
negative media portrayals of spaces and people, according to WCAC’s Director of
Planning. Negative attention to places and people can reinforce territorial and individual
stigma (Wacquant, 2010), something beyond the capacity of Shannon to address.
Siloed and Centralized Structure
It was expressed by almost all of the interviews that organizations are doing what
they would have done without Shannon, although through funding they are theoretically
able to do more. A Clark senior researcher stated that there is no organized vision, and that
Shannon is very centralized, and the pieces of the puzzle do not make a picture. Many
partners expressed that each organization is just doing a piece. Shannon supports programs
if they are in the general area of youth development and fit somewhat into any area of the
CGM. Essentially, there is a lack of an overall theory of change and strategic vision. The
CGM is the assumed theory of change, however, this is merely a script for strategy that is
narrowly interpreted.
Without more regular meetings of the partners it is also hard to strategize, or
discuss challenges and troubleshoot. WCAC’s Director of Jobs and Education expressed
how she feels disconnected from Shannon overall, with the Director of Planning adding
that if partners met more it could help with cross communication. In this sense, the
partnership is coordinating services and cooperating, but not collaborating, these are
different characteristics of partnerships (Carlton, Whiting, Bradford, Dyk & Vail; 2009).
Cooperation is where people work together to achieve a goal, whereas collaboration
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embodies a high degree of dialogue, creativity, evolution and excitement (Carlton et al.,
2009).
With partnerships as a response to the decentralization of power at the state level,
there has been a move from a vertical structure of government, where the state is dictating
conditions, to a horizontal structure of governance where the state is instead one of the
partners (Dahlstedt, 2009). The decision making power rests within the governmental
agency of the police department, this was understood by all the stakeholders. The Program
Coordinator shared that the state thinks the advisory committee has much more power than
it does, decision making continues to be centralized and controlled in one entity, limiting
collaboration. In Shannon the police department has assumed the role of the state, and has
not created an egalitarian environment where power is shared or developed outside of the
department.
There have been attempts to move beyond programmatic responses, as both senior
researchers realized early on that Shannon needed to move past programs to incorporate a
focus on structural barriers and systemic violence, however the other partners were not
interested in entertaining the idea of broadening the interpretation of the CGM to
incorporate a system’s level theory of change, which has kept individuals as the targets of
intervention.
Missing Voices in Planning and Decision-Making
To move to a theory of change that is accountable to the voices of oppressed groups
and the structural barriers they face would require the addition of CBPR principles into
Shannon. This would start to put pressure on the status quo of problematizing individual
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behavior. CBPR principles operate without a preconceived conceptualization of the
problem and desired intervention (Nation, et al., 2011). Without the inclusion of oppressed
groups, the problem and strategy formulated by the professional class, will continue to rest
on individual risk and responsibilization, with the individual becoming a scapegoat for
structural inequalities.
Over the life course of the Shannon partnership, communities, families and youth
have been essentially left out of the decision-making or strategy formulation process.
During the first few years of Shannon youth were interviewed about the employment
program so it could be tailored to their needs, and they were solicited for feedback for the
Clergy-Police mentoring program. However, youth, community nor family were
incorporated into any strategy formation or given a decision-making role. Goddard cites
Skogan (1988), and Cherney and Sutton’s (2007) identification of “insurgent groups” and
their belief that long-term crime reduction happens through challenging the existing
economic and social arrangements (Goddard, 2014). However, without those voices, we
are bound to the other group Skogan terms ‘preservationists’, who advocate policies that
continue the status quo (Goddard, 2014). Inclusion of “insurgent groups” could pressure
larger systems, by acting as an agent of change not being deemed a voiceless target. CBPR
principles, community coaction, and the inclusion of diverse voices could hold Shannon
accountable to be responsive to the community need identified by the community.
Both senior researchers expressed that Shannon perpetuated the jockeying for
money, however this is problematic given that these organizations could be more interested
in obtaining the money for their programs than for advancing a shared community vision
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within a partnership. “Organizations that seek to exploit the gang program simply to obtain
funds to narrowly enhance existing program efforts that may be unrelated to the goals and
objectives of the comprehensive, community-wide model may have to be bypassed or
terminated form the project. A special effort may need to be made to include grassroots
groups” (Spergel, 2010, p. 239). Shannon’s Program Coordinator expressed the need for
the voices of grassroots groups as they are more connected to the community, however he
experiences a barrier in bringing them into Shannon. WCAC’s Director of Planning
provided a potential answer as to why. Since Shannon is a reimbursement grant, grassroots
groups may not be able to do any work without funding provided upfront. This leaves
bigger organizations at the table competing for funds, potentially removed from what is
happening on the ground. The partnership relies on money to keep flowing from the state
to the partnership and there is not a structure built into the grant to allow for the inclusion
of grassroots groups, affirming how the partnership is an extension of governmentality and
the maintenance of the status quo.
SAM’s Director of Outreach voiced that he thought the input and participation of
former gang members in Shannon would add a lot of value to the program and the youth’s
experience being provided services through the program. “A fairly common strategic
organizational failure is the lack of interest or capacity of a program to employ former
gang members or influential as team members” (Spergel, 2010, p. 241). Part of
community mobilization is the inclusion of former gang members (Spergel, 1995, p. 172).
The implementation of the community mobilization strategy is very narrowly
implemented and lacks integrity. At the same time, there is no accountability or
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expectation that this component be integrated into the model, no clear direction about what
community mobilization means, and no expectation that action research include
community participation.

Shannon’s Successes and Partner Recommendations
Since 2010, there have been decreases in the number of aggravated assault and
simple assault victims and offenders. It is hard to say if this is correlated to Shannon and
the other youth serving partnerships in the city, or if the trend is correlated to something
else. However, a youth and gang problem still exists and is perceived as big enough to
dedicate a partnership to tackling.
Even with the barriers and challenges facing Shannon, various perspectives of the
successes of Shannon were shared during interviews. A common theme emerged in which
people expressed that the partnership was able to bring awareness to the issues of youth
and gang violence. However, the answers to what the community impact of the
partnership has been were divided. Some of the interviewees identified success as
reaching as little as one youth who was impacted in a positive way by services. WCAC’s
Director of Planning said that when she used to collect all the info for the quarterly reports,
she felt Shannon was absolutely working. She and others remarked that Shannon was a
slow incremental process, with subtle changes to address emerging needs. Other interviews
said “nothing”, meaning nothing is changing as a result of the partnership. Another
sentiment shared by the B&GC case worker is how the partnership is cutting down on
competition, leading to a more friendly relationship between service providers and greater
information sharing, collaboration and dialogue. Because power has been devolved to
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more localized entities like partnerships, it is expected that agencies would be more likely
to engage in active information sharing and collaboration to develop a robust network of
services. It is important to note that through Shannon the barrier of a CORI check was
removed to help kids get jobs through a referral system that may not have been possible
otherwise.
Several interviewees expressed different perspectives exist within the partnership,
but that those views are able to come together for the mission of reducing youth and gang
violence. Even though various organizational cultures exist, SAM’s Director of Outreach
expressed that there is space for all voices. Suppression and intervention are working on
different sides of the spectrum, but both WCAC’s Director of Planning and Director of
Jobs and Education voiced that all the pieces are necessary, and that one organization
cannot do it all. It could be argued that the CGM and Shannon allow that model of
dichotomous collaboration to exist, as neither outreach nor police efforts outside of
Shannon include each other in their strategies. Shannon’s model could be understood the
following way, “Modern youth justice appears as forever more hybrid; attempting to
deliver complex and contradictory amalgam of the punitive, the responsibilising, the remoralizing, the inclusionary, the exclusionary and the protective” (Muncie, 2006).
The recommendations made by interviewees were in response to the question of
what allows a youth to desist from violence and achieve success? SAM’s Director of
Outreach stated that there needed to be more funding for something radical, his idea is
being able to take more trips outside of Worcester with kids in the program. The few times
this has happened the kids go to a neighboring rural town and they ask if they are still in
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Massachusetts. Other interviewees echoed this by saying the best thing you could do is to
get these kids out of Worcester. This reinforces the power that poverty, lack of tangible
opportunity and territorial stigma have in dictating outcomes that exceed the individualized
opportunities that Shannon provides. However, his characterization of this
recommendation as radical seems overstated; it is not radical enough to de-individualize
interventions because it does not address ways to break down structural barriers and
change the status quo that limit the successes of the youth targeted by Shannon.

Discussion
I concluded that there have been successes in increasing awareness of youth
violence prevention and inter-agency communication. However, Worcester’s Shannon
partnership is an extension of governmentality tasked with conducting conduct, responsive
to neoliberal technologies of risk and responsibilization, and espousing a narrow
interpretation of the CGM that excludes the voices of oppressed groups. Given this
structure Shannon has not and will not move beyond programmatic responses to youth and
gang violence. The status quo will be further maintained by the current function of the
partnership.
These findings also reveal that Shannon is not a partnership, but instead is a
funding stream that connects service providers allowing programs to keep doing what they
have been doing. The Worcester model of Shannon is not radical; it is not putting pressure
or responsibility on systems or shifting the status quo, meaning it is in effect chasing
problems instead of developing solutions to root causes. If this is the case, the Shannon
partnership is not the way to solve the problem, and it is overstating the power it has in
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solving youth violence. It is taking up too much space in youth violence prevention,
limiting the exploration of ideas other than individualized interventions.
Researchers cannot tell policy makers or practitioners what the best course of
action is, because the best course of action is beset by individual and organizational values
and relies on assumptions about shared belief systems and shared objectives (Armstrong,
2004). Some of these belief systems and objectives are, in fact, using risk and
responsibilization technologies to govern. However, without an overall theory of change
within the partnership, developed through CBPR principles, an honest account of what the
partnership can accomplish, is reduced to a narrow interpretation of the CGM’s
suppression, intervention and prevention modalities.
It is important to mention that these findings could be interpreted in a different
way. It could be argued that the purpose of Shannon is to provide opportunities for youth
and the capacity of the partnership to do anything more lies beyond the purview of
Shannon. These opportunities are provided in the form of programs, which are not
unworthy of investment. Services provided by outreach and case management reach a lot
of youth and connect those youth to services they may have otherwise not been able to
access. However, without a parallel process that digs into addressing structural and
systemic barriers the programmatic responses to violence will always fall short of
achieving the overarching goal of reducing youth and gang violence because poverty and
stigma will still exist.
It could also be argued that the difference between doing good and doing bad are
choices, and that everyone has the ability to make the right choice. In effect, Shannon is
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offering the opportunity for youth to make the “good” or “right” choice. Services like
street outreach and case management do provide youth with opportunities for “good”
choices. However, I argue that not all youth have access to “good” choices or access to
sustain those choices because of the multiple disadvantages that are embedded in many
youth’s lives.
The limitations of this study are the missing voices within this analysis. The
knowledge the youth, whom Shannon directly impacts, have in providing
recommendations and analyses of the capacity of the programs is invaluable to developing
a comprehensive analysis of Shannon’s true capacity for community impact. This would be
a direction for future research.

Conclusion
The problem of youth and gang violence does not deserve a reactionary approach to
a solution (Goshe, 2014). Unless there is serious discussion about transforming structural
barriers and ‘contending with the welfare of youth’ (Goshe, 2014), Shannon will never get
ahead of the problem. However, “the transformation of wider society to reduce the
criminal effects of poverty and relative deprivation is certainly an even more challenging
task” (O’Mahony, 2009). This transformation ultimately does lie outside of Shannon to
address. However, Shannon has the power to increase awareness of the structural factors
that are producing the problem the partnership is trying to solve, by incorporating a theory
of change that is not operating blindly to structural limitations. Localized debates for
transformational politics and further governmental innovation (Muncie, 2006) as well as
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the integration of CBPR principles are needed before real change is produced and the
limits of what Shannon can realistically accomplish are realized.
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